The systematic biases seen in people's probability judgments are typically taken as evidence that people do not reason about probability using the rules of probability theory, but instead use heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable judgments and sometimes severe and systematic errors. This 'heuristics and biases' view has had a major impact in economics, law, medicine, and other fields; indeed, the idea that people cannot reason with probabilities has become a widespread truism. We present a simple alternative to this view, where people reason about probability according to probability theory but are subject to random variation or noise in the recall of items from memory. We show that this 'noisy recall' leads to systematic deviations in probability estimates, and that these deviations explain four reliable biases in human probabilistic reasoning: conservatism, subadditivity, conjunction fallacies, and disjunction fallacies. Analysing experimental data on probability estimation we find that when deviation due to noisy recall is cancelled, people's probability judgments are strikingly close to those required by probability theory. This shows that people's probability judgments embody the rules of probability theory, and that biases in those estimates are due to the effects of random noise in recall.
Introduction
The ability to reason with uncertain knowledge (that is, to reason with probabilities) is crucial to the ability to survive and prosper in "an ecology that is of essence only partly accessible to foresight" (Brunswik, 1955) . It is therefore reasonable to expect that humans, having prospered in such an ecology, would be able to reason about probabilities extremely well: any ancestors who could not reason effectively about probabilities would not survive long, and so the biological basis of their reasoning would be driven from the gene pool. Probability theory provides a calculus of chance describing how to make optimal predictions under uncertainty: taking the argument one step further, it is reasonable to expect that our probabilistic reasoning will follow the rules of probability theory.
The conventional view in current psychology is that this expectation is wrong. Instead, the dominant position is that
In making predictions and judgments under uncertainty, people do not appear to follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction. Instead they rely on a limited number of heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable judgments and sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, p. 237) This conclusion is based on series of systematic and reliable biases in people's judgements of probability, many identified in the 1970s and 1980s by Tversky, Kahneman and colleagues. The heuristics and biases approach has reached a level of popularity rarely seen in psychology (with Kahneman recieving a Nobel Prize for his work in this area) and has had a major impact in economics (Camerer et al., 2003 , Kahneman, 2003 , law (Korobkin and Ulen, 2000, Sunstein, 2000) , medicine (Dawson and Arkes, 1987, Eva and Norman, 2005) and other fields (Williams, 2010 , Hicks and Kluemper, 2011 , Bondt and Thaler, 2012 , Richards, 2012 . Numerous popular science books have presented this view to the general public, and the idea that people cannot reason with probabilities has become a widespread truism: for example, the Science Gallery in Dublin recently announced an exhibition on risk which it describes as "enabling visitors to explore our inability to determine the probability of everything from a car crash to a coin toss" (The Irish Times -Thursday, October 11, 2012) .
In this paper we present evidence against this view. This evidence consists of a series of experimental results showing that, when the influence of random noise in people's probabilistic reasoning is cancelled out, people's probability judgments are on average unbiased; that is, indistinguishable from those required by probability theory. We identify probabilistic expressions where noise is cancelled via a simple account where people reason about probability according to the rules of probability theory, but are subject to random variation or noise in their recall of items from memory. This account predicts that there should, on average, be no systematic bias or error in people's judgements for probabilistic expressions with a certain mathematical form. This account also makes predictions about the level of bias in probabilistic expressions: it predicts that the level of bias should on average have the same constant value across a range of different expressions with a certain mathematical form. Our experimental data gives strong confirmation of these predictions. These results demonstrate that when this noise in recall is cancelled, people's probability estimates follow the rules of probability theory and that biases in those estimates are due to noise. These predictions, and the results confirming them, are the main contribution of our work.
While this account predicts no bias for probabilistic expressions with a certain mathematical form, it predicts systematic and reliable patterns of bias for expressions with other forms. At first glance it may seem that noise in the workings of a rational system will result in "nothing more than error variance centered around a normative response" (Shafir and Leboeuf, 2002) . There are, however, a number of ways in which noise in recall can produce systematic and reliable deviations from the normatively correct responses. In the first section of this paper we present our account by demonstrating these deviations and showing how they explain four specific biases frequently seen in people's probabilistic reasoning: conservatism, subadditivity, the conjunction fallacy, and the disjunction fallacy. The general patterns of occurrence of these biases match the predictions of our simple account.
We are not alone in proposing an alternative to heuristics and biases that is based on noise; many other such accounts have been described in the literature (see Costello, 2009a ,b, Erev et al., 1994 , Hilbert, 2012 , Dougherty et al., 1999 . These accounts can also explain conservatism, subadditivity, the conjunction fallacy, and the disjunction fallacy, often in ways that are similar to the explanation our account gives. We present and discuss these accounts in detail in the first part of our paper. The critical difference between our account and others is that our account makes specific and testable predictions about the degree of bias in probabilistic expressions, and about expressions where that bias will vanish. In the second and third sections we present our account's predictions and describe two experimental studies testing and confirming these predictions. In the fourth section we assess previous results suggesting that bias becomes more frequent as random variation falls ); these results are contrary to our account. We point out two serious problems that undermine these results, and show that in our experimental data bias becomes reliably more frequent as random variation increases, in line with our account. In the final section we give a general discussion of our work.
The systematic influence of noise
In this section we present our 'noisy recall' account of probabilistic reasoning by showing how it explains four specific biases frequently seen in people's probabilistic reasoning: conservatism, subadditivity, the conjunction fallacy, and the disjunction fallacy.
In discussing the influence that random noise in recall has on probabilistic reasoning we assume a rational reasoner with a long-term episodic memory that is subject to random variation or error in recall. We take P (A) to represent the objective, true probability of some event A, P E (A) to represent a reasoner's estimate of that probability, and P E (A) to represent the mean or expected value of P E (A) (the average estimate of the probability of event A). For simplicity we assume that, apart from random variation, the reasoner is 'perfect': that is, if the reasoner were not subject to random variation then each estimate P E (A) would be equal to the correct probability P (A).
We assume that long-term memory contains m episodes where each recorded episode i contains a flag that is set to 1 if i contains event A and set to 0 otherwise, and the reasoner estimates the probability of event A by counting these flags. We assume a minimal form of transient random noise, in which there is some small probability d that when some flag is read, the value obtained is not the correct value for that flag. We take C(A) to be number of flags that were read as 1 in some particular query of memory, and T A be the number of flags whose correct value is actually 1. Our reasoner computes P E (A) by querying episodic memory to count all episodes containing A and dividing by the total number of episodes, giving P E (A) = C(A) m Repeated estimates of the probability of event A will have randomly varying values, with this variation being caused by the number of flags that were incorrectly read in each estimate. The long-term average or expected value of P E (A) is given by
(since on average 1 − d of the T A flags whose value is 1 will be read as 1, and d of the m − T A flags whose value is 0 will be read as 1 ). Since we assume that if the reasoner were not subject to noise in recall then each estimate P E (A) would be equal to P (A), we have
and the average value of P E (A) deviates from P (A) in a way that systematically depends on P (A). Individual estimates will vary randomly around this expected value and so for any specific estimate P E (A) where C(A) flags were read as having a value of 1, we have
where
m represents positive or negative random deviation from the expected value across all estimates. Note that this error term e does not introduce an additional source of random error in probability estimates: it simply reflects the difference between the number of flags that were read incorrectly when computing the specific estimate P E (A) and the the number of flags that are read incorrectly on average, across all estimates.
Conservatism
In this section we show how our noisy recall account of probabilistic reasoning explains a reliable pattern of conservatism seen in people's probability estimates.
Probabilities range in value between 0 and 1. A large body of literature demonstrates that people tend to keep away from these extremes in their probability judgments, and so are 'conservative' in their probability assessments. These results show that the closer P (A) is to 0, the more P E (A) is greater than P (A), while the closer P (A) is to 1, the more P E (A) is less than P (A). Differences between true and estimated probabilities are low when P (A) is close to 0.5 and increase as P (A) approaches the boundaries of 0 or 1. This pattern was originally seen in research on people's revision of their probablity estimates in the light of further data (Edwards, 1968) , and was later found directly in probability estimation tasks. This pattern is sometimes referred to as underconfidence in people's probability estimates (see Erev et al., 1994 , Hilbert, 2012 , for a review).
Conservatism will occur as a straightforward consequence of random variation in our otherwise perfect reasoner. As we saw in Equation 1, the average value of P E (A) deviates from P (A) in a way that systematically depends on P (A). This deviation produces the pattern of conservatism seen in people probability judgments. If P (A) = 0.5 this deviation will be 0, if P (A) < 0.5 then since d cannot be negative we have P E (A) > P (A) with the difference increasing as P (A) approaches 0, and if P (A) > 0.5 then P E (A) < P (A) with the difference increasing as P (A) approaches 1, just as seen in people's probability judgments.
Other accounts
The idea that conservatism can be explained via random noise is not new to our account, but is also found in Erev et al. (1994) 's account based on normallydistributed error in probability estimates, in the Minerva-DM memory-retrieval model of decision making (Dougherty et al., 1999) , and in Hilbert's account based on noise in the information channels used in probabilistic reasoning (Hilbert, 2012) . The underlying idea in these accounts is similar to ours. There is, however, a critical difference: our account predicts no systematic bias for probabilistic expressions with a certain form (see Section 3).
Subadditivity
Here we show how our noisy recall account explains various patterns of 'subadditivity' seen in people's probability estimates.
Let A 1 . . . A n be a set of n mutually exclusive events, and let A = A 1 ∨. . .∨A n be the disjunction (the 'or') of those n events. Then probability theory requires that
Experimental results show that people reliably violate this requirement, and in a characteristic way. On average the sum of people's probability estimates for events A 1 . . . A n is reliably greater than their estimate for the probability of A, with the difference (the degree of subadditivity) increases reliably as n increases. An additional, more specific pattern is also seen: for pairs of mutually exclusive events A 1 and A 2 whose probabilities sum to 1 we find that the sums of people's estimates for A 1 and A 2 are normally distributed around 1, and so on average this sum is equal to 1 just as required by probability theory. This pattern is sometimes referred to as 'binary complementarity' (see Tversky and Koehler, 1994 , for a detailed review of these results).
Again, these patterns of subadditivity occur as a straightforward consequence of random variation in our otherwise perfect reasoner. From Equation 1 we have
and using the fact that P (A 1 ) + . . . + P (A n ) = P (A) this gives
Taking the difference between this expression and that for P E (A) in equation (1) we get
and so this difference increases as n increases, producing subadditivity as seen in people's probability judgments. In the case of two mutually exclusive events A 1 and A 2 whose probabilities sum to 1, from Equation (1) we get
producing binary complementarity as seen in people's judgments.
Other accounts
The original account for subadditivity given by Tversky and Koehler (1994) explained the general pattern in terms of an unpacking process which increased the probability of constituent events by drawing attention to their components. This account could not explain the observed pattern of binary complementarity; to account for this observation Tversky and Keohler proposed an additional 'binary complementarity' heuristic, which simply stated that there was no average bias for binary complements.
An alternative explanation for subaddivity is given in the Minerva-DM memory retrieval model of decision making (Dougherty et al., 1999, Neil Bearden and Wallsten, 2004) . Minerva-DM is a complex model with a number of different components: it provides a two-step process for conditional probability judgments, a parameter controlling the retrieval of items with varying degrees of similarity to the memory probe (the event whose probability is being judged), a complex multi-vector representation for stored items in memory, a parameter controlling the degree of random error in the initial recording of items in memory, a parameter controlling the degree of random error causing degradation in stored items, and a parameter controlling the degree of detail contained in memory probes. Roughly stated, the Minerva-DM model estimates the probability of some event by counting the number of stored items in memory which are similar enough to that event (whose similarity measure is greater than the similarity criterion parameter). Depending on the value of the similarity criterion, this count will include a number of similar-but-irrelevant items in addition to items correctly matching the target event. Because of these similar-but-irrelevant items the model will give a probability estimate for the target event that is higher than the true probability, producing a degree of subaddivity that increases with the number of component events in the disjunction, just as required. Note, however, that because this similarity-based account always increases probability estimates, it cannot explain the observed pattern of binary complementarity in people's probability judgments, which can only be explained if one probability is increased and the other complementary probability is decreased.
More recently Hilbert (2012) gave an account of subadditivity based on noise in the information channels used for probability computation. Hilbert's model is a very general one, providing for noise at the initial encoding of data, for noisy degradation of stored information, and for noise during the reading of data from memory. The model also specifies three general requirements for the distribution of noise: that the correct probability is most likely, that noise is symmetrical around the correct probability, and and that two binary complementary probabilities have the same degree of noise:this final requirement allows the model to explain the 'binary complementarity' result observed by Tversky and Koehler (1994) . Beyond these requirements, the model leaves the degree and form of noise in the system unspecified. Again, this account is similar to ours but with the critical difference that our account predicts no systematic bias for certain probabilistic expressions. We give a further comparison between our model, Hilbert's model, and Minerva-DM in Section 6.
Conjunction and disjunction fallacies
Conservatism and subadditivity both concern averages of people's probability estimates. Here we show how our noisy recall account explains two patterns that involve differences between probability estimates: the conjunction and disjunction fallacies.
Let A 1 and A 2 be any two events ordered so that P (A 1 ) ≤ P (A 2 ). Then probability theory requires that
(where A 1 ∧ A 2 represents 'A 1 and A 2 '). This follows from the fact that A 1 ∧ A 2 can only occur if A 1 itself occurs. People reliably violate this requirement for some events, giving probability estimates for conjunctions that are greater than the estimates they gave for one or other constituent of that conjunction. This 'conjunction fallacy' does not occur for all or even most conjunctions (people correctly follow the rules of probability theory for most conjunctions). Numerous experimental studies have shown that the occurrence of this fallacy depends on the probabilities of A 1 and A 2 . In particular, the greater the difference between P (A 1 ) and P (A 2 ), the more frequent the conjunction fallacy is, and the greater the conditional probability P (A 1 |A 2 ), the more frequent the conjunction fallacy is (Costello, 2009a , Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991 , Fantino et al., 1997 .
A similar pattern occurs for people's probability estimates for disjunctions. Since A 1 ∨ A 2 ( 'A 1 or A 2 ') necessarily occurs if A 2 itself occurs, probability theory requires that
must always hold. People reliably violate this requirement for some events, giving probability estimates for disjunctions that are less than the estimates they gave for one or other constituent. Just as for the conjunction fallacy, the greater the difference between P (A 1 ) and P (A 2 ), and the higher the estimated conditional probability P (A 1 |A 2 ), the higher the rate of occurrence of the disjunction fallacy (Costello, 2009b, Carlson and Yates, 1989) .
Again, these patterns occur as a straightforward consequence of random variation in our otherwise perfect reasoner. As we saw earlier, the reasoner's estimates for probabilites P E (A 1 ) and P E (A 1 ∧ A 2 ) at any given moment are given by
and
where e A1 and e A1∧A2 represent positive or negative random deviation from the expected estimate at that time (arising due to random errors in reading flag values from memory, as in Equation 2). The conjunction fallacy will occur when
or, substituting and rearranging, when
holds. Given that e A1∧A2 and e A1 vary randomly and can be either positive or negative, this inequality can hold in some cases. The inequality is most likely to hold when P (A 1 ) − P (A 1 ∧ A 2 ) is low (because in that situation the left side of the inequality is low). Since
we see that P (A 1 ) − P (A 1 ∧ A 2 ) is low when P (A 1 ) is low and P (A 1 |A 2 ) and P (A 2 ) are high. We thus expect the conjunction fallacy to be most frequent when P (A 1 ) is low and P (A 1 |A 2 ) and P (A 2 ) are both high. This is just the pattern seen when the conjunction fallacy occurs in people's probability estimates. Reasoning in just the same way for disjunctions, we see that the disjunction fallacy will occur when
or, substituting and rearranging as before, when
holds. But from the probability theory we have
and substituting we see that the disjunction fallacy will occur when
and so, just as with the conjunction fallacy, we expect the disjunction fallacy to be most frequent when P (A 1 ) is low and P (A 1 |A 2 ) and P (A 2 ) are both high. Again, this is just the pattern seen when the disjunction fallacy occurs in people's probability estimates.
Other accounts
A large and diverse range of accounts have been proposed for the conjunction and disjunction fallacies. Tversky & Kahneman's original proposal explained these fallacies in terms of a representativeness heuristic, in which probability is assessed in terms of the degree to which an instance is representative of a (single or conjunctive) category. For example, in their best-known experiment on this fallacy Tversky & Kahneman gave participants a personality sketch of Linda, who was described as outspoken, intelligent, and politically active (in terms of the representativeness heuristic, Linda is an instance). Tversky & Kahneman then asked people to assess the probability that 'Linda is a bank-teller' and the probability that 'Linda is a bank-teller and active in the feminist movement' (in terms of the representativeness heuristic 'bank-teller' and 'bank-teller and active feminist' are single and conjunctive categories). Participants gave a higher probability to the conjunctive statement; under Tversky & Kahneman's interpretation, this was because the instance Linda was more representative of (that is, more similar to members of) the conjunctive category 'bank-teller and active feminist' than the single category 'bank-teller'. Although the representativeness heuristic remains the routine explanation of the conjunction fallacy in introductory textbooks, experimental results speak against this account. Notice that the representativeness heuristic only applies when a question asks about the probability of membership of an instance in a conjunctive category, and only applies when knowledge about representative members of that category is available. Evidence against representativeness comes from results showing that the conjunction fallacy occurs frequently when these requirements do not hold. For example, a series of studies by Osherson, Bonini and colleagues have shown that the conjunction fallacy occurs frequently when people are asked to bet on the occurrence of unique future events: such bets are not questions about membership of an instance in a category, and so representativeness cannot explain the occurence of the fallacy in these cases (Sides et al., 2002 . Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991) found that the conjunction fallacy occured frequently when people are asked about categories for which no representativeness information is available (questions about imaginary aliens on other planets). Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991) also found that the fallacy occured frequently when the probability question was not about the membership of an instance in a conjunctive category, but about the membership of two seperate instances in two seperate single categories (rather than asking about the probability of Linda being a bank teller and active feminist, such questions might ask about the probability of Bob being a bank-teller and Linda being an active feminist). Again, representativeness cannot explain the occurence of the conjunction fallacy for such questions (see Nilsson et al., 2009 , for a review of research in this area).
The MinervaDM account gives an alternative explanation for the conjunction fallacy that is based on the role of similarity in retrieval (Dougherty et al., 1999) . Minerva-DM estimates the probability of some event by counting the number of stored items in memory whose similarity to the probe event is greater than the similarity criterion parameter. For a conjunction A ∧ B, stored items that are members of A alone or members of B alone can be similar enough to the conjunction A ∧ B to be (mistakenly) counted as examples of that conjunction. If there are a large number of such similar-but-irrelevant items, the conjunctive probability estimate P E (A ∧ B) may be higher than the lower constituent probability P E (A), producing a conjunction fallacy response. Note, however, that because this similarity-based account always increases probability estimates, it cannot explain the disjunction fallacy (which occurs when a disjunctive probability estimate is lower than one of its constituent probabilities).
Other accounts have been proposed where people compute conjunctive probabilities P E (A ∧ B) from consituent probabilities P E (A) and P E (A) using some equation other than the standard equation of probability theory. In early versions of this approach the conjunctive probability was taken to be the average of the two constituent probabilities (Fantino et al., 1997, Carlson and Yates, 1989) . This averaging approach does not apply to disjunctive probabilities. More recently Juslin, Nilsson and colleagues have proposed a more sophisticated 'configural cue' model where conjunctive probabilities are computed by a weighted average of constituent probability values, with a greater weight given to the lower constituent probability, and where disjunctive pobabilities are computed by a weighted average with greater weight given to the higher constituent probability.
Since the average of two numbers is always greater than the minimum of those two numbers and less than the maximum (except when the numbers are equal), these averaging accounts predict that the conjunction fallacy will occur for almost every conjunction (except when the two constituents have equal probabilities). This is clearly not the case, however: there are many conjunctions for which these fallacies occurs rarely if at all. To address this problem, Nilsson et al.'s model also includes a noise component which randomly perturbs conjunctive probability estimates, sometimes moving the conjunctive probability below the lower constituent probability and so eliminating the conjunction fallacy for that estimate. This model thus predicts that fallacy rates should be inversely related to the degree of random variation in people's probability judgments, with fallacy rates being highest when random variation is low and lowest when random variation is high. This contrasts with our account, which predicts that fallacy rates should be high when random variation is high and low when random variation is low. We assess these competing predictions in Section 5.
Finally, we should mention an earlier model for the conjunction fallacy proposed by one of us (Costello, 2009a) . Just as in our current account, this earlier model proposed that people's probability estimates followed probability theory but were subject to random variation: this random variation caused conjunction fallacy responses to occur when constituent and conjunctive probability estimates were close together. Apart from that commonality the two models are quite different. Unlike our current account this earlier model was not based on the idea of noise causing random errors in retrieval from memory: instead, that model assumed that estimates P E (A) for some event A were normally distributed around the correct value P (A), and so in that model the average estimate P E (A) was equal to the true value P (A). That earlier model was therefore unable to account for the patterns of conservatism and subadditivity seen in people's probability estimates. Also unlike our current account, that earlier model assumed that conjunctive and disjunctive probabilities were computed by applying the equations of probablity theory to constituent probability estimates, so that P E (A ∧ B) = P E (A) × P E (B|A). This contrasts with the current model, which computes P E (A ∧ B) by retrieving episodes of the event A ∧ B from memory. Finally, that earlier model does not predict that error will be cancelled out for probabilistic expressions with a certain mathematical form (predictions that our current account does make, and that we test in the next section).
Experiment 1
Our account in which probability estimates are normatively correct but influenced by random noise can explain various patterns of bias in people's probability judgements, and also explain some specific situations in which those biases vanish (when probabilities are close to 0.5, for conservatism; and when two complementary probabilities sum to 1, for subadditivity). We now present a third situation in which our account predicts that bias will disappear.
Consider an experiment where we ask people to estimate, for any pair of events A and B, the probabilities of A, B, A∧B and A∨B. For each participant's estimates for each pair of events A and B we can compute a derived sum
We can make a specific prediction about the average value of X E (A, B) for all events A and B. This value will be
From Equation 1 we get
However, from probability theory we get The critical point here is that the distribution of these values is essentially the same across different probability values. A −1 to +1 probability scale is used here: note that later figures use the 100 point rating scale from the experiments.
for all events A and B, and we see that X E (A, B) = 0. Our prediction, therefore, is that the average value of X E (A, B) across all pairs of events A and B will be equal to 0. What is the distribution of values of X E (A, B) around this average of 0? Speaking generally, we would expect this distribution to be roughly symmetric around the mean of 0 for any pair A, B, since the positive and negative terms in the expression X E (A, B) are symmetric (P (A) + P (B) = P (A ∧ B) + P (A ∨ B).
We examined this expectation in detail via Monte-Carlo simulation, by writing a program that simulates the effects of random noise in recall on probability estimations for a given set of probabilities. This program took as input three probabilities P (A), P (B|A) (B given A) and P (B|¬A) (B given notA). These three input probability values can each take on any value between 0 and 1 and for any combination of such values these input probabilities together fully specify the probabilities of events A, B, A ∧ B and A ∨ B in a way that is consistent with probability theory. The program constructed a 'memory' containing 1000 items, each item containing flags A, B, A ∧ B and A ∨ B indicating whether that item was an example of the given event. The occurence of those flags in memory exactly matched the probabilities of the given event as specified by the three input probabilities. This program also contained a noise parameter d (set to 0.25 in our simulations); when reading flag values from memory to generate some probability estimate P E (A), the program was designed to have a random chance d of returning the incorrect value. For a given set of input probabilities P (A), P (B|A) and P (B|¬A) the program carried out 10, 000 runs, on each run generating noisy estimates P E (A), P E (B), P E (A ∧ B) and P E (A ∨ B) and using those estimates to calculate a value for the expression X E (A, B). These runs give us a picture of the distribution of values of X E (A, B). We carried out this simulation process for 27 different sets of values for the input probabilities P (A), P (B|A) and P (B|¬A). This set consisted of every possible assignment of values from {0.25, 0.5, 0.75} to each probability, and covered the range The distribution of X E values was essentially the same for all these sets of input probabilities: unimodal, approximately symmetric, and centered on 0 just as expected. Figure 1 graphs the frequency distributions of all X E values across all probability sets. Given that this distribution appears to be essentially independent of the probability values used in our simulations, our prediction is that in an experiment, values X E (A, B) across all pairs of events A and B will be unimodal and approximately symmetric around the mean of 0.
Testing the predictions
We tested these predictions using data from an experiment on conjunction and disjunction fallacies (Experiment 3 in Costello, 2009b) . The original aim of this experiment was to examine an attempt by Gigerenzer to 'explain away' the conjunction fallacy as a consquence of people being asked to judge the probability of one-off, unique events (Gigerenzer, 1994) . Gigerenzer argued that from a frequentist standpoint the rules of probability theory apply only to repeatable events and not to unique events, and so people's deviation from the rules of probability theory for unique events are not, in fact, fallacious. To assess this argument the experiment examined the occurrence of fallacies in probability judgements for conjunctions and disjunctions of canonical repeatedly-occurring events: weather events such as 'rain', 'wind' and so on. Contrary to Gigerenzer's argument, participants in these experiments often committed conjunction and disjunction fallacies; these fallacies thus cannot be dismissed as an artifact of researchers using unique events in their studies of conjunctive probability.
This experiment gathered estimates P E (A), P E (B), P E (A ∧ B) and P E (A ∨ B) from 83 participants for 12 pairs A, B of weather events. Two sets of weather events (the set 'cloudy, windy, sunny , thundery' and the set 'cold, frosty, sleety') were used to form these pairs. These sets were selected so that they contained events of high, medium and low probabilities. Conjunctive and disjunctive weather events were formed by pairing each member of the first set with every member of the second set and placing 'and'/'or' between the elements as required, generating weather events such as 'cloudy and cold', 'cloudy and frosty', and so on. One group of participants (N = 42) were asked questions in terms of probability, with the form
• What is the probability that the weather will be W on a randomly selected day in Ireland?
for some weather event W . This weather event could be a single event such as 'cloudy', a conjunctive event such as 'cloudy and cold' or a disjunctive event such as 'cloudy or cold'. The second group (N = 41) were asked questions in terms of frequency, with the form
• Imagine a set of 100 different days, selected at random. On how many of those 100 days do you think the weather in Ireland would be W ?
where the weather events were as before. These two question forms were used because of a range of previous work showing that frequency questions can reduce fallacies in people's probability judgments; the aim was to check whether this question form could eliminate fallacy responses for everyday repeated events. Participants were given questions containing all single events and all conjunctive and disjunctive events, with questions presented in random order on a web browser. Responses were on an integer scale from 0 to 100. There was little difference in fallacy rates between the two forms of question, so we collapse the groups together in our analysis. There were 996 distinct conjunction and disjunction responses in the experiment (83 participants ×12 conjunctions): a conjunction fallacy was recorded in 49% of those responses and a disjunction fallacy in 51%.
For every pair of weather events A, B used in the experiment, each participant gave estimates for the two constituents A and B, for the conjunction A ∧ B and for the disjunction A ∨ B. Each participant gave these estimates for 12 such pairs. For each participant we can thus calculate the value X E (A, B) for 12 pairs A, B, and so across all 83 participants we have 996 distinct values of X E (A, B). Our prediction is that the average of these values will equal 0 and that these values will be approximately symmetrically distributed around this average.
Results
For each participant we calculated the value X E (A, B) for all 12 pairs of events, and so we have 996 distinct values of X E (A, B). Figure 2 graphs the raw frequency of occurrence of these values in the experimental data and the average frequency in groups of those values. It is clear from the graph that these values are symmetrically distributed around the mean, just as expected. The mean value of X E was 0.66 (SD = 27.1), within 1 unit of the predicted mean on the 100-point scale used in the experiment and within 0.025 standard deviations of the predicted mean. The predicted mean of 0 lay within the 99% confidence interval of the observed mean. This is strikingly close agreement with our predictions. To examine the relationship between conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates and X E values we compared the total number of conjunction and disjunction fallacies produced by each participant with the average value of X E for that participant. Figure 3 graphs this comparison. There was no significant correlation between the average value of X E produced by a participant and the number of fallacies produced by that participant (r = −0.1074, p = 0.34).
Discussion
The above result is based on a specific expression X E that cancels out the effect of noise in people's probability judgements. When noise is cancelled in this way we get a mean value for X E that is almost exactly equal to that predicted by probability theory. This close agreement with probability theory occurs alongside significant conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates in the same data. This co-occurrence cannot be explained by an account where people estimate proba- 
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Figure 3: Relationship between conjunction and disjunction fallacies and average X E (A, B) value in Experiment 1. This scatterplot shows the total number of conjunction and disjunction fallacies produced by each participant versus the average values of X E (A, B) across all pairs for that participant. There critical point here is that the fallacies occur frequently even when X E (A, B) = 0, just as required by probability theory. bilities using heuristics: such an account would predict either systematic error in conjunctions, disjunctions and X E values, or no error in any of those values. Contrary to this, the results show values of X E close to zero even for participants with high conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates (Figure 3 ). These results therefore show that that people follow probability theory when judging probabilities, and that the observed patterns of bias are due to the systematic distorting influence of noise: when distortions due to noise are cancelled out as in expression X E , no other systematic bias remains.
In the next section we describe a new experiment re-testing this result and testing similar predictions for a range of other expressions.
Experiment 2
It should be clear that our prediction for the derived expression X E holds because the associated expression X sums to 0, and because there are an equal number of positive and negative terms in the expression (these two requirements are necessary to cancel out the d or noise terms in the expression). We now give another expression where these requirements both hold, and so for which the same prediction follows.
Consider an experiment where we ask people to estimate, for any pair of events A and B, the probabilities of A, B, A ∧ B, A ∨ B, and A ∧ ¬B, B ∧ ¬A ('A and not B', 'B and not A'). In this case one derived sum is
whose expected value will be
However, from probability theory we have P (A) + P (B ∧ ¬A) = P (B) + P (A ∧ ¬B) (because each side of the expression is equal to P (A ∨ B)) and so we have P (A) + P (B ∧ ¬A) − P (B) − P (A ∧ ¬B) = 0 for all events A and B, and again we predict that the average value of Y E across all participants and event pairs will equal to 0. Since the positive and negative terms in the expression Y E (A, B) are symmetric (just as in X E ), we again expect values for Y E (A, B) to be symmetrically distributed around this mean, just as with X E (this prediction is supported by Monte Carlo simulations similar to those described earlier). Finally, since both X E and Y E have the same mean of 0 we predict that the larger combined set of all values of X E and Y E across all participants and event pairs will also have an mean of 0, and will be symmetrically distributed around that mean.
We can also consider other derived sums whose values in probability theory are 0, but where there is not an equal number of positive and negative terms in the expression (and so not all d or noise terms will be cancelled out). Four such expressions are
For the first expression Z1 E (A, B) from Equation 1 we get
since from probability theory P (A) + P (B ∧ ¬A) − P (A ∨ B) = 0 for all A and B, and since there are two positive terms and one negative term. We get the same result for the expressions Z2, Z3 and Z4, and so we have expected values of
for all pairs A, B. Our prediction, therefore, is that expressions Z1 . . . Z4 should all have the same average value in our experiment. Two other such derived sums are
Expression Z5 has three positive terms and one negative term and so we have an expected value of Z5 E (A, B) = 2d for all pairs A, B. Expression Z6 E has four positive terms and two negative terms and so also has an expected value of Z5 E (A, B) = 2d for all pairs A, B. Our prediction, therefore, is that expressions Z5 and Z6 should have the similar average values in our experiment, and that this average should be twice the average for Z1 . . . Z4. Note that since these expressions are not symmetric (all have 'left over' d terms) we do not expect the values of these expressions to be symmetrically distributed.
Testing the predictions
To test these predictions (and re-test our original prediction from Experiment 1), we carried out a new experiment gathering people's estimates for P (A), P (B), P (A ∧ B), P (A ∨ B), P (A ∧ ¬B), and P (B ∧ ¬A) for 9 different pairs A, B of weather events such as 'rainy','windy' and so on. We constructed sets of 3 weather events each (the set rainy, cold, icy and the set cloudy, windy, sunny) selected to cover a range of different probabilites, and used these to form pairs. We then formed conjunctions, disjunctions and conjunctions with negations by pairing each member of the first set with every member of the second set. There were 68 participants, all undergraduate students at the School of Computer Science and Informatics, UCD. To stay as close as possible to the first experiment, participants were randomly assigned to two groups, with one group asked questions in frequency form as above and the other asked questions The critical point here is that these values are symmetrically distributed around 0 as predicted in our account. in probability form. Participants judged the probability of all single events and all conjunctions, disjunctions and conjunctions with negations, with questions presented in random order on a web browser. Responses were on an integer scale from 0 to 100.
Results
Two participants were excluded (one because they gave responses of 100 to all but 4 questions the other because they gave responses of 0 to all but 2 questions) leaving 66 participants in total. There were thus 594 distinct conjunction and disjunction responses for analysis in the experiment (66 participants ×9 conjunctions): a conjunction fallacy was recorded in 46% of those responses and a disjunction fallacy in 40%. For every pair of weather events A, B used in the experiment, each participant gave probability estimates for the two constituents A and B, for A ∧ B and A ∨ B, and for A ∧ ¬B and B ∧ ¬A. Each participant gave these estimates for 9 such pairs. For each participant we calculated the value X E (A, B) , Y E (A, B), (A, B) . . . Z6 E (A, B) for 9 pairs A, B, and so across all 66 participants we have 594 distinct values for each of those expressions.
Expressions X E and Y E
The mean value of X E was −3.90 (SD = 27.7) and the mean value of Y E was 3.82 (SD = 30.08). To examine the relationship between conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates and X E and Y E values we compared the total number of conjunction and disjunction fallacies produced by each participant with the average X E and Y E values for that participant. As in the previous experiment, there was no significant correlation between the average values produced by a participant and the number of fallacies produced by that participant (r = −0.073 and r = −0.018 respectively); the results showed values of X E and Y E close to zero even for participants with high conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates. Again, this is contrary to the heuristics account, which would predict either systematic error in conjunctions, disjunctions and X E and Y E values, or no error in any of those values.
Expressions Z1 E . . . Z4 E
Recall that expressions Z1 . . . Z4 should in probability theory have a value of 0, and that in our account estimates for these expressions should on average all have the same biased value, equal to d (the noise rate). Table 1 gives the average values for these expressions calculated from participant's probability estimates; it is clear that these values are closely clustered (all are less than 0.1 SD from the mean) just as predicted. Recall that expressions Z5 E and Z6 E should in probability theory have a value of 0, and that in our account estimates for these expressions should on average have the same biased value, equal to 2d (the noise rate). Our prediction therefore is that values for Z5 E and Z6 E should fall close together, and should fall close to twice the overall mean obtained for expressions Z1 E . . . S4 E (as in Table 1 ). Table 2 gives the average values for these expressions calculated from participant's probability estimates, and compares with twice the overall mean of Z1 E . . . S4 E . It is clear that these values are closely clustered around that predicted value (both are less than 0.05 SD from the predicted value, and their mean is less than 0.001 SD from that predicted value). According to our account the mean values of expressions Z1 E . . . Z4 E are equal to the average value of d, the rate of random error in recall from memory, and the mean values of expressions Z5 E and Z6 E are equal to the average value of 2d. This raises the interesting possiblity of using the values of expressions Z1 E . . . Z6 E for a given participant to estimate a value of d for that participant, and so estimate the degree of variability due to noise in that participant's probability estimates. We discuss this possibility in the next section.
Random variation and fallacy rates
As described earlier, the conjunction fallacy occurs in our account when random error causes a participant's given estimate for a conjunction to be greater than that participant's estimate for one of its constituents. In this account the rate of occurence of the conjunction fallacy is related to the degree of random variation: if there were no random variation in participant's estimates the fallacy would never occur, while if there is a high degree of random variation the fallacy would occur frequently. The same prediction applies to the disjunction fallacy.
Juslin, Nilsson and colleagues' 'configural cue' model for conjunction and disjunction ) makes the opposite prediction. In that model conjunctive probabilities are computed by a weighted average of constituent probabilities, and so are expected to always be greater than one constituent probability (giving a conjunction fallacy response). To account for the fact that people do not produce conjunction fallacy responses in all cases, this model provides a random variation component that sometimes moves a conjunctive estimate below the lower constituent probability (so avoiding the conjunction fallacy). This model predicts that conjunction fallacy rates should be inversely related to the degree of random variation in people's probability estimates, with fallacy rates being highest when random variation is low and lowest when random variation is high. Again, the same prediction applies to the disjunction fallacy. Nilsson et al. (2009) carried out an experiment testing these predictions. In that experiment, participants were asked to assess the probability of 90 conjunctive events, 90 disjunctive events, and 180 constituent events (2 constituents per conjunction/disjunction). The experiment had a 'test-retest' format with each participant being asked to assess each probability twice, once in block 1 and once in block 2. By asking each participant to assess each probability twice, this experiment provides a measure of the degree of random variability in participants' responses.
Nilsson et al. could have examined the relationship between random variability and fallacy rates by computing the average degree of variation in each participant's responses, and comparing a participant's average degree of variability with the number of times that participant produced conjunction or disjunction fallacy responses. Instead Nilsson et al. took a different approach. First, they counted the number of conjunction and disjunction fallacy responses in the complete set of participants' probability estimates from both blocks of responses. Reasoning that averaging across a set of estimates will reduce the variability in those estimates, Nilsson et al. then calculated the average probability estimate given by each participant for each constituent, conjunction and disjunction (summing the estimates that participant gave in the two blocks and dividing by 2). They then counted the number of conjunction and disjunction fallacy responses in the averaged estimates for each participant (that is, the number of times where a participant's average probability for a conjunction was greater than the average probability for one of its constituents, and the number of times where a participant's average probability for a disjunction was less than the average for one of its constituents). Finally, they calculated the difference between the proportion of conjunction fallacy responses in the set of averaged estimates and the proportion of such responses in the complete set of estimates. They found that this difference was positive, showing that the conjunction fallacy occurred more frequently in the averaged estimates than in the complete set of probablity estimates. The same positive difference occurred for the disjunction fallacy. Nilsson et al. thus concluded that the reduction in random variation caused by averaging caused these fallacies to occur more frequently in averaged estimates.
If fallacy rates are higher when random variation is reduced, this would count as strong evidence against our account (which predicts the opposite). In this section, therefore, we examine Nilsson et al.'s results in detail. First, we give a mathematical analysis showing that, contrary to Nilsson et al.'s assumption, the difference in fallacy rates between averaged and complete probability estimates does not measure the link between random variation and fallacy rates. Instead, this difference measures a (somewhat obscure) property of the complete data set, unconnected to random variation. This analysis negates Nilsson et al.'s conclusion that a reduction in random variation increases fallacy rates. Second, we use this analysis to show that the observed pattern of higher fallacy rates in averaged data is in fact contrary to the predictions of the configural cue model, and instead is in line with the predictions of our account. Finally, we describe an analysis of the relationship between random variation and these fallacies in our experimental data: this shows that fallacy rates were directly related to the degree of random variation, higher when variation was high and lower when variation was low, contrary to Nilsson et al.'s result and just as predicted in our account.
An analysis of fallacy rates in averaged data
In this analysis of fallacy rates in averaged data we focus on the conjunction fallacy and assume a simplified version of Nilsson et al's experiment, where R participants are asked to estimate the probablity of a single conjunction A ∧ B and its constituents A and B. We assume throughout that A is the less probable constituent. For some participant i we take P i,1 (A), B i,1 (A) and P i,1 (A ∧ B) to represent that participant's estimates for A, B and A ∧ B in block 1, P i,2 (A), P i,2 (B) and P i,2 (A ∧ B) to represent that participant's estimates in block 2. We define functions
that have the value of 1 if the conjunction fallacy occurred for participant i in block 1, block 2 or in their averaged probability estimates. Given these definitions, the difference between the proportion of fallacy responses in the averaged data and the proportion of fallacy responses in the complete data is
This value D corresponds to the difference computed by Nilsson et al. We now define the following function
Put simply, this function measures the extent to which conjunction and constituent probability values are closer together when a conjunction fallacy response is produced than when a non-fallacy response is produced. More strictly, C gives the proportional difference between the number of participants who produced a conjunction fallacy in one block only and where the conjunction and constituent probabilities were closer in the fallacy response and the number of participants who produced a fallacy response in one block only and where conjunction and constituent probabilities were closer in the non-fallacy response. Note that this function C is not related to any reduction in random variation due to averaging; instead, it simply represents a property of the complete set of probability estimates. We now show that D = C necessarily holds. This means that Nilsson et al.'s difference D does not measure the relationship between a reduction in random variation and the production of fallacy responses; instead it simply measures the value of variable C in the complete set of estimates.
To see that D = C, first note that
and so
Noting that F 1 (i) = F 2 (i) implies F 1 (i) + F 2 (i) = 1, we can rewrite this as
From the definition of F avg (i) we can rewrite this as
Expanding the sum gives
Finally, rearranging the inequalities we get
and so D = C as required.
Reasoning in just the same way we find the same result for the disjunction fallacy. These results show that, contrary to Nilsson et al.'s assumption, differences in fallacy rates between averaged and complete probability estimates do not measure the link between random variation and fallacy rates, and so do not indicate that fallacy rates increase when random variation is reduced.
Predicted fallacy rates in averaged data
We now consider the predictions the configural cue model ) makes about the value of the function C (and hence about the difference D). Recall that from the definition, C is positive if among all participants who gave a conjunction fallacy in one block only, there are more participants for which the constituent probability was closer to the conjunctive probability in the fallacy block than in the non-fallacy block. C is negative if among all participants who gave a conjunction fallacy in one block only, there are more participants for which the constituent probability was closer to the conjunctive probability in the non-fallacy block than in the fallacy block.
In the configural cue account, people estimate the probability of a conjunctive event A ∧ B by a weighed average of the constituent probabilities P (A) and P (B), where greater weight is given to the lower constituent probability. Taking A to be the less probable constituent and α > 0.5 as the weighting parameter, in this model the expected probability of A ∧ B is given by
This weighed average is always greater than the lower probability P E (A), and so should always produce a conjunction fallacy response. To account for the fact that the conjunction fallacy does not always occur, the configural cue model assumes random variation in probability estimats, which will sometimes move an individual estimate P E (A ∧ B) below P (A) and so produce a non-fallacy P E (B) P E (A) P E (AB) 0 an example probability density function for P E (A ∧ B) for a typical distribution of constituent probabilities. Note that in the 'non-fallacy area' (where a conjunctive probablity estimate is less than the lower constituent probability P E (A)) individual estimates P E (A ∧ B) are most likely to fall close to P E (A).
response. The distribution of these individual estimates P E (A ∧ B) will follow some density function centered on P E (A∧B); the greater the value of this density function in a given area, the higher the probability that an individual estimate P E (A ∧ B) will fall into that area. This density function will be monotonically decreasing in some way with increasing distance from P E (A ∧ B) (reflecting the fact that random variation is more likely to produce small deviations from the expected value than to produce large deviation). Figure 5 shows a characteristic relationship between P E (A), P E (B) and P E (A ∧ B) in this model, and graphs one possible density function for the random distribution of invididual estimates P E (A ∧ B) (the exact shape of this distribution is irrelevant to our analysis). This figure divides the density function for P E (A∧B) into two areas: the 'fallacy area' (where P E (A∧B) falls above the constituent probability P E (A), producing a conjunction fallacy) and the non-fallacy area (where P E (A ∧ B) falls below the constituent probability P E (A), producing a non-fallacy response). To examine this model's predictions about the value of variable C, we need to consider the expected difference between P E (A ∧ B) and P E (A) in the fallacy area of the graph, and compare with the expected difference between P E (A) and P E (A ∧ B) in the non-fallacy area. As is clear from this graph, since the density function for P E (A ∧ B) is monontonically decreasing with distance from P E (A ∧ B), in the non-fallacy area this function is highest for values close to and just below P E (A). In the non-fallacy area, therefore, the difference between P E (A) and P E (A ∧ B) is, on average, going to be small. In the fallacy area, however, the density function for P E (A ∧ B) is monotonically increasing with P E (B) P E (A) P E (AB) 0 Distribution of P E (AB) (randomly varying around mean)
Density
Fallacy area
Non-fallacy area 1
Probability values
Figure 6: Graph illustrating our account and showing an example probability density function for P E (A ∧ B) for a typical distribution of constituent probabilities. Note that in this account individual estimates P E (A ∧ B) in the 'fallacy area' are most likely to fall close to P E (A).
distance from P E (A) rising to its maximum at P E (A∧B). In this area, therefore, the difference between P E (A ∧ B) and P E (A) is going to be large (on average, slightly greater than the difference between P E (A ∧ B) and P E (A)). Combining these observations we see that the configural cue model predicts that, among participants who gave a fallacy response in one block only, there will be more participants for which the constituent probability is closer to the conjunctive probability in the non-fallacy block than in the fallacy block. In other words, the configural cue model predicts a negative value for the variable C and hence for the measure of difference in fallacy rates D. The configural cue model's account for disjunctions is based on the same weighted average but with the position of weights reversed (in disjunctions the higher constituent probability gets the greater weight). Carrying out the same analysis for the disjunction fallacy we get the same prediction . These predictions are contrary to Nilsson et al.'s results, where D was positive. Note that these predictions depend only on the minimal assumption that the density function for P E (A ∧ B) is declining with distance from its mean. We can make a similar analysis for our account. Following probablity theory, in our account the expected value or average for a conjunctive probablility P E (A ∧ B) is less than the expected average for its constituents P E (A) and P E (B) People's individual estimates of a conjunctive probability vary randomly due to random error in recall, sometimes moving an individual estimate P E (A ∧ B) above P E (A) and so producing a fallacy response. The distribution of these individual estimates P E (A ∧ B) will follow some density function centered on P E (A ∧ B) and monotonically decreasing in some way with increasing distance from P E (A ∧ B). Figure 6 shows a characteristic relationship between P E (A), P E (B) and P E (A ∧ B) in this model, and graphs one possible density function for the random distribution of invididual estimates P E (A ∧ B). As is clear from this graph, since the density function for P E (A∧B) is monontonically decreasing with distance from P E (A ∧ B) , in the fallacy area this function is highest for values close to and just above P E (A). In the fallacy area, therefore, the difference between P E (A ∧ B) and P E (A) is, on average, going to be small. In the non-fallacy area, however, the density function for P E (A∧B) is monotonically increasing with distance from P E (A) rising to its maximum at P E (A ∧ B). In this area, therefore, the difference between P E (A ∧ B) and P E (A) is going to be large (on average, slightly greater than the difference between P E (A ∧ B) and P E (A)). Our account thus predicts that, among participants who gave a fallacy response in one block only, there will be more participants for which the constituent probability is closer to the conjunctive probability in the fallacy block than in the non-fallacy block. Carrying out a similar analysis for the disjunction fallacy we get the same result. Our model therefore predicts a positive value for the variable C and hence for the measure of difference in fallacy rates D, just as seen Nilsson et al.'s results.
Random variation and fallacy rates across participants
In this section we analyse the relationship between random variation and conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates using the data from our Experiment 2. In this analyis we use each participant's mean values for expressions Z1 E . . . Z6 E to estimate a value of d, the rate of random variation in recall for that participant. For each participant we can compute 6 estimates for that participant's value of d, by taking that participant's average value for each expression Z1 E . . . Z6 E (and dividing the averages for Z5 E and Z6 E by 2). To examine the consistency of these estimates we computed the pairwise correlation across participants between values of d estimated from each expression. Every pairwise correlation was significant at the p < 0.0001 level, and the average level of correlation was relatively high (mean r = 0.79), indicating that the values for d estimated for each participant from each of these expressions were consistent with each other.
Given this consistency we can produce an average estimate for d for each participant i,
where for example Z1 i represents the average value of the derived sum Z1 E (A, B) computed from participant i's probability estimates for the 9 pairs A, B. This gives a reasonable measure of the degree of random variation in recall for that participant. We can use this measure of the degree of random variation associated with a participant to test two competing predictions mentioned earlier: our prediction that conjunctive and disjunctive fallacy rates will rise with the degree of random variation, and Nilsson et al.'s prediction that conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates will fall with random variation . To test these prediction we simply measured the correlation between conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates across participants and the d i random variation measure. There was a significant positive correlation between conjunction fallacy rates and the random variation measure (r = 0.57, p < 0.0001) and between disjunction fallacy rates and the random variation measure (r = 0.43, p < 0.0005), demonstrating that fallacy rates rise with random variation as in our account.
General Discussion
We can summarise the main results of our experiments as follows: when distortions due to noise are cancelled out in people's probability judgments (as in expressions X E and Y E ) those judgements are, on average, just as required by probability theory with no systematic bias. This close agreement with probability theory occurs alongside significant conjunction and disjunction fallacy rates in people's responses. This co-occurrence cannot be explained by an account where people estimate probabilities using heuristics: such an account would predict either systematic error in conjunctions, disjunctions, X E and Y E values, or no error in any of those values. Further, our results show that when one noise term is left after cancellation (as in expressions Z1 E . . . Z4 E ), a constant 'unit' of bias is observed in people's probablity judgments, and when two noise terms are left after cancellation (as in expressions Z5 E and Z6 E ), twice that 'unit' of bias is observed in people's judgments,just as predicted in our simple account. Again, these results cannot be explained by an account where people estimate probabilities using heuristics: such an account would not predict agreement in the degree of biases across such a range of different expressions. These results demonstrate that people follow probability theory when judging probabilities in our experiments and that the observed conjunction and disjunction fallacy responses are due to the systematic distorting influence of noise and are not systematically influenced by any other factor.
It is worth noting that, while our results demonstrate that people's probability estimates given in our experiments followed probability theory (when bias due to noise is cancelled out) we do not think people are consciously aware of the equations of probability theory when estimating probabilities. That is evidently not the case, given the high rates of conjunction and disjunction fallacies in people's judgments. Indeed we doubt whether any of the participants in our experiment were aware of the probablity theory's requirement that our various derived sums should equal 0 or would be able to apply that requirement to their estimations. Instead we propose that people's probability judgments are derived from a 'black box' module of cognition that estimates the probability of an event A by retrieving (some analogue of) a count of instances of A from memory. Such a mechanism is necessarily subject to the requirements of set theory and therefore implicitly embodies the equations of probability theory.
We expect this probability module to be based on observed event frequen-cies, and to be unconscious, automatic, rapid, parallel, relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity and evolutionarily 'old'. Support for this view comes from that fact that people make probability judgments rapidly and easily and typically do not have access to the reasons behind their estimations, and from extensive evidence that event frequencies are stored in memory by an automatic and unconscious encoding process (Hasher and Zacks, 1984) . Other support comes from results showing that animals effectively judge probabilities (for instance, the probability of obtaining food from a given source) and that their judged probabilities are typically close to optimal (Kheifets and Gallistel, 2012) . We also expect this probability module to be subject to occasional intervention by other cognitive systems, and particularly by other conscious and symbolic processes that may check the validity of estimates produced. We expect this type of intervention to be both rare and effortful. To quote one participant in an earlier experiment where participants had to bet on a single event or on a conjunction containing that event: 'I know that the right answer is always to bet on the single one, but sometimes I'm really drawn to the double one, and it's hard to resist'.
Comparing models of probabilistic reasoning
The heuristics and biases approach proposes that people do not follow the rules of probability theory when estimating probabilities: instead they use various heuristics that sometimes give reasonable judgments but sometimes lead to severe errors in estimation. The results given above directly contradict this proposal, showing that when the effect of noise is cancelled, people's probability estimates closely follow the fundamental rules of probability theory. It is important to stress that these results are the central point in our argument against heuristics and biases. We are not arguing that the heuristics and biases approach is incorrect because our simple model of noisy retrieval from memory can explain four well-known biases (there are many other biases in the literature which our model does not address: base-rate neglect, the hard-easy effect, confirmation bias, the confidence bias, and so on; see (Hilbert, 2012) for a review). Instead, our main point is that our experimental results demonstrate that the fundamental idea in the heuristics and biases approach (that people do not follow the rules of probability theory) is seen to be incorrect when we use our simple model to cancel the effects of noise.
Our results also argue against models where people reason about probability using equations different to those of probability theory (Carlson and Yates, 1989 , Fantino et al., 1997 ). Our results give support for models where people follow probability theory in their probabilistic reasoning, but are subject to the biasing effects of random noise.
Our simple account of noisy probability estimation is useful precisely because it is so simple: simple enough to give clear and testable predictions about the effects of noise on probability estimation. Equally, however, this account is in many ways too simple to be a fully realistic model of the processes involved when people estimate probabilities. For example, our account assumes that, for any event A, there is a clear-cut binary criterion for membership in A: a given memory trace is either an instance of event A or it is not. Given the complexity of event representation and the graded nature of most natural categories, this assumption is unrealistic: it is more likely that stored instances vary in their degree of membership in the category A, and that the process of retrieval from memory would reflect this (as in the Minerva-DM model Dougherty et al. (1999) . Equally, our simple account assumes that there is only one point at which random noise influences probability estimation: the point at which memory is queried for stored instances of event A. Again, this is unrealistic: it is more likely that noise has an influence on initial perceptual processes, on event encoding, on retrieval, on subsequent processing and on decision-making and action (as in Hilbert's 'noisy channel' model; Hilbert (2012) ). Finally, our account applies only to unconditional probabilities not to conditional probabilities P (B|A) (the probability of B given that A has occurred). Conditional probability estimation requires a two-stage process as provided in both Minerva-DM and in Hilbert's model. Such a two-stage process could also be used to extend our 'noisy recall' account: an important aim for future work is to see whether any useful predictions could be derived from such an extension.
Both Minerva-DM and Hilbert's noisy channel model give more realistic descriptions of the processes of probability estimation than given by our simple account. This realism comes at the cost of increased complexity, however: both models have various interacting components and parameters that can be tuned in different ways to match behaviour. Because of this complexity, it is difficult to derive clear and testable predictions from these models. This is the main advantage of our account: its simplicity allows us to derive clear, specific and verifiable predictions about the impact of random variation on human probabilistic reasoning.
Concluding Remarks
The focus in our work has been on people's estimation of simple, unconditional probabilities. Our results show that patterns of systematic bias in these estimates can be explained via noise in recall, and that when this noise is cancelled, people's estimates match the requirements of probability theory closely, with no further systematic bias. This result has general implications for research on people's use of heuristics in reasoning. A frequent pattern in that research is to identify a systematic bias in people's responses, and to then take that bias as evidence that the correct reasoning process is not being used. We believe that this inference is premature: as we've seen, random noise in reasoning can cause systematic biases in people's responses even when people are using the correct reasoning process. To demonstrate conclusively that people are using heuristics, researchers must show that observed biases cannot be explained as the result of random noise. To put it simply: biases do not imply heuristics.
